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Knight: Federal Practice--Venue--Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(b), V

FEDERAL PRACTICE-VENUE-PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. SECTION 1391(b), VENUE FOUND PROPER ONLY IN DISTRICT IN WHICH
TAKEOVER

STATUTE PROMULGATED AND

FROM WHICH

STATUTE

ENFORCED. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2710

(1979).
The judicial resolution of venue disputes, historically a function of statutory interpretation in the United States,' significantly affects the presentation and outcome of the litigants' case.

Without the certainty of statutory interpretation, practitioners
are unable to predict the propriety of their selection of a particular forum and therefore, they risk the multitude of problems that
accompany suits in distant fora, mandatory transfers or dismissals. 2 Venue in the federal district courts generally is determined
under 28 U.S.C. section 13911 for both diversity and nondiversity
actions. The phrase "in which the claim arose," added to subsections (a) and (b) of that statute in 1966,1 has been the subject of
multifarious interpretations by courts and commentators. Until

June 26, 1979, however, the United States Supreme Court had
refrained from an examination5 of the meaning of these words.
Leroy v. Great Western United Corp.I arose as a result of the
activities of Great Western, a Texas-based corporation, which
had made a tender offer to shareholders of an Idaho corporation
in an attempt to takeover the Idaho business. Great Western
complied with all federal regulations concerning the tender offer,
but Idaho officials, acting under authority granted by the Idaho
takeover statute, effectively precluded the tender offer. A declaratory action was brought in the Northern District of Texas
by Great Western, seeking to have the Idaho takeover statute
declared unconstitutional in its effects and preempted by
federal statute. In response to a motion challenging the propriety
1. Stevens, Venue Statutes:Diagnosisand Proposed Cure, 49 MICH. L. Rav. 307, 30708 (1951).
2. See notes 57-60 and accompanying text infra.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1976). The pertinent text of the statute is as follows: "(b) A civil
action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought
only in the judicialdistrict where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose,except
as otherwise provided by law." Id. § 1391(b) (emphasis added).
4. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-714, §§ 1-2, 80 Stat. 1111 (1966).
5. But cf. Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 710 n.8
(1972) (merely discussing "venue gap" closing purpose of Act); Denver & R. G. W. R.R.
v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 558 (1967) (cursory consideration of
meaning of § 1391(b) in dictum, for the suit was brought before the statute was amended).
6. 99 S. Ct. 2710 (1979).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1980

1

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
31
South
Carolina Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. [Vol.
11

of venue, Great Western argued that for purposes of section
1391(b) the claim arose in Texas since enforcement of the
Idaho statute restricted its corporate activities in Dallas. The
district court held that Great Western's choice of venue was
improper under section 1391(b), 7 but on appeal the Fifth Circuit
approved venue in the Texas district." The Supreme Court, however, held that because the locus of certain factors surrounding
the enactment and enforcement procedures of the challenged
state statute was Idaho, "the District of Idaho [was] the only one
in which 'the claim arose' within the meaning of § 1391(b)." 9
Measuring the extent and merit of the Leroy v. Great
Western decision requires careful review of the historical framework of venue in the federal courts, the legislative history and
congressional intent behind the 1966 amendments, and the trends
in interpretation and tests developed by lower federal courts.
Analysis from this perspective reveals Leroy v. Great Western as
only a superficially vital and conclusive decision; its principal
significance arises from its failure to eradicate the uncertainties
that have surrounded evocations of venue in the "district. . . in
which the claim arose."
I.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

In its earliest stages of development, venue evolved from its
original purpose of merely serving the convenience of the court
into a principle valuing convenience to the litigants."0 In the colonial period, venue was used to ensure a fair trial for the defendant
who could otherwise be forced to travel great distances, endure
much hardship and incur great expense in presenting his defense
far from home, in hostile communities with unfamiliar procedures and customs."I These goals of convenience and fairness have
continued to be paramount. Competing policies and changes in
society, technology, and legal practices, howevei, have combined
to foster a trend toward an increasingly broader choice of fora for
the aggrieved plaintiff.
7. Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420, 433 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
8. Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1979).
9. 99 S. Ct. at 2718-19. See notes 63-89 and accompanying text infra.

10. Wood, Federal Venue: Locating the Place Where the Claim Arose, 54 Tax. L. REv.
392, 393 (1976).
11. See generally Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 801, 808 (1976) (though dealing
with venue in criminal cases, historical principles are analogous).
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The Judiciary Act of 178912 allocated suits in federal courts
by limiting venue to districts inhabited by the defendant, or in
which the defendant could be found. Since the passage of the 1789
Act, Congress has, with one exception, 3 gradually provided for a
more liberal choice of venue. A limited grant of jurisdiction, however, restricted the full exercise of venue choice provided by the
1789 Act. In 1875, however, jurisdiction was expanded, thereby
allowing full use of the 1789 venue provisions. 4 The effect of the
statutory change of 1875 was, therefore, to expand the selection
of venue. The 1888 restrictions, limiting venue to only the district
inhabited by the defendant, were intended to reduce the deluge
of cases under the post-Civil War amendments.' 5 Venue was expanded for certain cases by special provisions in the Judicial
Code of 194816 and a 1963 addition to section 1391.'1 This trend
toward expanding venue to districts other than the defendant's
residence culminated in the 1966 amendments to section 1391,11
the general federal venue statute.
The reasons for restricting choices of venue have changed
since 1789. As a result, the policy considerations relied upon by
courts in selecting venue also have changed. Because of vastly
improved transportation and communication systems and because legal customs have become generally uniform,' the residence of the defendant is no longer the vital consideration.2" Current policy considerations include fairness to plaintiffs, convenience of witnesses, availability of physical evidence,2 ' and conser12. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 78. See Barrett, Venue and Service of
Process in the FederalCourts-Suggestionsfor Reform, 7 V AD. L. REv. 608 passim (1954).
13. Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433. See Penrod Drilling Co. v. Johnson,
414 F.2d 1217, 1224 (5th Cir. 1969).
14. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. See Barrett, supra note 12, at 609-10.
15. Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433. See Barrett, supra note 12, at 610
(change originally made in 1887, but corrected in 1888).
16. Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, ch. 646, §§ 1391-1406, 62 Stat. 869,
935-37 (1948). See Barrett, supra note 12, at 611.
17. Act of Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-234, 77 Stat. 473.
18. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-714, §§ 1-2, 80 Stat. 1111 (1966). See also
H.R. 7382, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 112 CONG. REc. 21756 (1966).
19. See, e.g., Gardner Eng'r Corp. v. Page Eng'r Co., 484 F.2d 27, 33 (8th Cir. 1973);
Arnold v. Smith Motor Co., 389 F. Supp. 1020, 1024 (N.D. Iowa 1974); Ehrenzweig, From
State Jurisdiction to Interstate Venue, 50 ORE. L. REv. 103, 107 (1971); Seidelson,
Jurisdictionof Federal Courts HearingFederal Cases: An Examination of the Propriety
of the LimitationsImposed by Venue Restrictions,37 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 82, 86-88 (1968).

20. See

15 C. WRIGHT,

A.

MILLER

& E.

COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

3806, at 25 (1976) [hereinafter cited as C. WRIGHT].
21. Wood, supra note 10, at 393. See also Denver & R. G. W. R.R. v. Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 560 (1967).
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vation of judicial resources," as well as the traditional deference
to protecting defendants. The proper method of balancing these
policies, however, is far from clear.
The courts' traditional disfavor of plaintiffs' forum shopping23 demonstrates a judicial tendency to disregard the desires
of the plaintiff in selecting the proper forum for trial. This tendency can be contrasted with the espoused purpose of modern
venue provisions-the balancing of the conveniences of all the
parties, including the plaintiff. The revived focus on convenience of the court itself merely has been superimposed on this
contrast by both courts and commentators. Emphases of the
newly revived approach include: the need for uniformity in federal question cases, 5 the need for federal courts to hear the multidefendant federal question cases that otherwise were being forced
into state courts by restrictive venue provisions," and the need
for the less important concept of venue to cease restricting the
exercise of the more important and broader grant of jurisdiction.Y
Authorities have recently advanced compelling reasons for
requiring the defendant to litigate in any district convenient
to the plaintiff: the plaintiff is supposedly the aggrieved party
and the defendant is presumably the wrongdoer, the plaintiff
bears the expenses of initiating the action and carries the burden
of going forward, and any federal court should be equally competent to hear the matter.28 No due process problem should arise if
the plaintiff chooses a district in which there is some logical
22. Iranian Shipping Lines, S.A. v. Moraites, 377 F. Supp. 644, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Foster, Long-Arm Jurisdictionin Federal Courts, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 9, 40-41.
23. Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 459 (N.D. Ga. 1972); see also La Brum, The Fruits
of Babcock and Seider: Injustice, Uncertainty and Forum Shopping, 54 A.B.A.J. 747, 747

(1968) (general discussion of analogous factors in jurisdictional issues).
24. Tefal, S.A. v. Products Int'l Co., 529 F.2d 495, 497 (3d Cir. 1976).

25. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp., 291 F.
Supp. 252, 260 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
26. Barrett, supra note 12, at 635.
27. See Brieant & Scheindlin, Venue in the Second Circuit:A Topic Whose Time Has
Come, A Review of Civil and Criminal Venue Cases 1970-1976, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 841,
841-42, 844 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brieant]; Wood, supra note 10, at 392. See
generally Seidelson, supra note 19, at 83-88.
28. E.g., Commercial Lighting Prod., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 537 F.2d
1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 1976); Gardner Eng'r Corp. v. Page Eng'r Co., 484 F.2d 27, 33 (8th

Cir. 1973); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123, 133 (D.N.H.
1975); Arnold v. Smith Motor Co., 389 F. Supp. 1020, 1024 (N.D. Iowa 1974); 15 C.

WRIGHT, supra note 20, § 3806 at 34; Ehrenzweig, supra note 19, at 110-11; Seidelson,
supra note 19, at 85. Contra, Barrett, supra note 12, at 629.
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connection among the claim, the parties, and the forum. 9 Acceptance of this primary focus on the plaintiff, a nontraditional approach, further clouds the proper interaction of competing policies and represents the result of another extreme shift in the
purposes underlying venue.
As the policy considerations have shifted, so have the objectives served by venue. The concept of venue has evolved through
three stages: as an instrument for convenience of the court, as a
vehicle for protection of the defendant, and as a mechanism for
balancing convenience of the court and all parties. The resurgence of concepts that support the convenience of the court and
recent emphasis on the needs of the plaintiff have created interactional difficulties. In conjunction with the gradual expansion of
the statutory grant of venue, the shifting policies invoked by the
courts as guidelines demonstrate that neither a party nor a
court solely dictates the place of trial.
II.

THE

1966

AMENDMENTS

The most recent and most controversial statutory expansion
of venue has been the addition, in the 1966 amendments, of the
words "in which'the claim arose" to section 1391. Prior to the
passage of these amendments, venue was proper in federal question cases under section 1391(b) only in the "district where all the
defendants reside[d]."'

This rule barred plaintiffs who wished

to bring one suit in a federal court when the action involved
multiple defendants residing in more than one district. Hence an
anomaly, commonly referred to as "venue gap," was created: the
plaintiff often could find the district court with both proper jurisdiction and amenable service of process, but was barred from
bringing the suit because venue was not provided in that district
under the statute.3 '
In 1959 the Judicial Conference of the United States lobbied
for and obtained expansion of section 1391 to correct the venue
gap problem. The changes allowed venue where the injury took
place in automobile tort cases. That expansion was eventually
repealed, and superseded by the more general grant in the 1966
29. Foster, supra note 22, at 36-40.

30. Honda Assocs., Inc. v. Nozawa Trading, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 886, 890 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
31. Wood, supra note 10, at 394-97. See 15 C. WRIGHT, supra note 20, § 3806 at 26-
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amendments.32 Commentators believed not only that venue in the
district in which the claim arose resolved the venue gap problem,
but also that venue at that situs was more likely to be fair and
c'onvenient. 3 No authorities have disputed, however, that in enacting the 1966 amendments Congress wanted to assure at least
one proper venue, eradicating the venue gap, in all cases. 4
The crucial puzzle of the amendments results from Congress'
use of the definite article "the" in allowing venue in "the judicial
district

. . .

in which the claim arose."35 Courts and commenta-

tors have disagreed on whether this language precludes the claim
from arising in more than one district. The disagreement is evidenced by two divergent lines of decisions in lower federal courts.
Some courts have interpreted the statute to allow venue in any
district in which any part of the claim arose, while other courts
have determined that the statute restricts venue to only the single
district in which a whole3 claim arose. 37 Congressional history
"affords little guidance," making reference to "liberaliz[ing]
the venue provisions" and "providing . . . a more convenient
forum . . . for the litigants,"39 but not indicating the interpreta-

tion Congress intended with its word selection. Extended debate
32. Wood, supra note 10, at 396-97.
33. See Foster, JudicialEconomy; Fairnessand Convenience of Place of Trial: LongArm Jurisdictionin District Courts, 47 F.R.D. 73, 102-03 (1970).
34. See, e.g., Honda Assocs., Inc. v. Nozawa Trading, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 886, 891
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Wood, supra note 10, at 397.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976) (emphasis added). See 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.142 [5.-21 at 1432 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as MOORE'S].
36. Compare Commercial Lighting Prod., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 537 F.2d
1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 1976) (preferring approach allowing more than one state and district);
Liberation News Serv. v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379, 1382 n.4 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.,
assumes claim arose "perhaps in both" districts); and Transamerica Corp. v. Transfer
Planning, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1261, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (using indefinite article, "in a
district"); with Quinn v. Bowmar Publishing Co., 445 F. Supp. 780, 783 (D. Md. 1978)
(referring to "the one district"); Ghazoul v. International Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 398 F. Supp.
307, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (asserting that all districts are to be compared to discern the
one best suited); and Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Std. Sanitary
Corp., 291 F. Supp. 252, 260 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (applying similar approach to select the
district most suitable). See generally 1 MOORE's, supra note 35, 0.142 [5.-2] at 143134.
0.142 [5.-2] at 1431-34. Interpretations range
37. 1 MOORE'S, supra note 35,
from the district in which any part of the claim arose to the single district in which the
greatest part of the claim arose. Id.
38. Honda Assocs., Inc. v. Nozawa Trading, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 886, 890 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
39. S.REP. No. 1752, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONO.
& An. NEWS 3693, 3694 (emphasis added). See Honda Assocs., Inc. v. Nozawa Trading,
Inc., 374 F. Supp. 886, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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generally precedes congressional acts that effect extreme shifts of
existing statutory positions. If Congress had intended the broader
expansion involved in recognizing more than one situs of the
claim simultaneously, then the absence of controversy over enactment of the amendments is indeed curious. Congressional reports
reveal, in addition to the absence of debates, a use of the words
"minor change" in a reference to the 1966 amendments by their
principal proponent in the House." Authorities supporting the
expansive interpretation, however, argue that Congress would
not intend to take away with restrictive venue provisions that
which it gave with liberal grants of jurisdiction.4" Although venue
gap may have been narrowed with the adoption of the 1966
amendments, the uncertainty fostered by the language of the
amendments led to new problems for the lower federal courts.
IlI.

TRENDS AND TESTS IN THE COURTS

The lower federal courts have employed numerous tests to
determine where the claim arose for purposes of the venue statutes. This multiplicity of tests stems directly from the controversy surrounding Congress' use of the definite articles in the 1966
amendments. The differing tests applied by courts vary in degrees of restrictiveness. Whether a court interprets the 1966
amendments expansively or restrictively, therefore, tends to determine which test will be selected.
The "weight-of-contacts" test was first considered definitively by a Pennsylvania district court.42 This test, the most popular, necessitates quantitative and qualitative comparison of each
potential forum's contacts with the claim. The weight-of-contacts
test has developed in three variations according to courts' interpretation of the restrictiveness required by the statute. Initially,
this test precluded venue in all but the single district with the
greatest weight of contacts (most-significant-contacts test)." The
40. H.R. 7382, supra note 18, at 21756 (remarks of Rep. Brooks).
41. Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 710 (1972);
Iranian Shipping Lines, S.A. v. Moraites, 377 F. Supp. 644, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Seidelson, supra note 19, at 83.
42. See Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp., 291
F. Supp. 252, 260 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
43. Id. at 260-62. Arguably, the Pennsylvania district court discusses the mostsignificant-contacts test in dictum; the court's emphases, however, on the conspiratorial
meetings among defendants and the need for limiting choices of venue indicate that the
court actually applies this test.
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same court subsequently indicated in a related case, however,
that in order to meet the statutory requirements for proper venue,
the contacts between the forum and the claim need only be substantial (substantial-contacts test)." The many courts applying
this variation of the test consider the words of the 1966 amendments in a manner requiring an analysis similar to the minimum
contacts, due process and fairness analyses of jurisdiction. 5
Under the substantial-contacts test, which tends to provide
venue in almost any forum in which jurisdiction is proper,48 the
claim could be found to arise in more than one district simultaneously. A liberal modification of the substantial-contacts test
is evidenced by recent cases in which it was held that venue was
proper in any district where merely "more than miniscule" contacts between claim and situs could be found (more-thanminiscule-contacts test)." This third variation reflects a court's
adoption of the most expansive interpretation of the amendthat claims arise
ments to section 1391, inherently anticipating
48
in more than one district simultaneously.
The second most widely used test has been the "place of
injury" or "impact test."49 Courts invoking this test recognize
that the claim originates in the district where the injury occurs
or is felt, since the right of action only accrues when the party is
injured." This test, criticized for being too mechanical and rigid,5 '
is sometimes paradoxical in its results. A plaintiff most fre44. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp., 309 F.
Supp. 1053, 1056 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
45. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ("minimum contacts" test).
46. See notes 27 & 41 and accompanying text supra.
47. Honda Assocs., Inc. v. Nozawa Trading, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 886, 892 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). See Tefal, S.A. v. Products Int'l Co., 529 F.2d 495,497 (3d Cir. 1976); Transamerica
Corp. v. Transfer Planning, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1261, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
48. One criticism of this test is that, in its more expansive forms, it is no different
from tests of jurisdiction. In this sense, the weight-of-contacts test amounts to a superfluous exercise.
49. 1 MooRE's, supra note 35, 0.142 [5.-2] at 1434.
50. Gardner Eng'r Corp. v. Page Eng'r Co., 484 F.2d 27, 33 (8th Cir. 1973); Quinn v.
Bowmar Publishing Co., 445 F. Supp. 780, 783 (D. Md. 1978); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru
of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123, 133 (D.N.H. 1975). Slight variations of this approach
also exist, e.g., Iranian Shipping Lines, S.A. v. Moraites, 377 F. Supp. 644, 648 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) ("target" metaphor test); Simenez v. Pierce, 315 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(nerve center test); Alemeda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 164, 169
(W.D. Mo. 1970) (headquarters test). See Wood, supra note 10, at 408-10 (categorizing
and coining the labels of these variations).
51. Arnold v. Smith Motor Co., 389 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (N.D. Iowa 1974).
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quently will experience injury in the district where he resides, and
that district generally will be most convenient for the plaintiff to
bring suit. The tendency of the test, which is to allow the selection of the forum at the residence of the plaintiff, aligns the
impact test with the most liberal of the purposes of
venue-convenience of the plaintiff. 2 The tendency of the impact
test to mechanically limit the extension under the 1966 amendments to the one district in which the plaintiff is injured, however, suggests that the test also is highly restrictive. The results
of the impact test, therefore, can be characterized as both liberal
and restrictive. Although this paradox between results may be
equally indicative of either interpretation, the antinomical quality is not fatal to the effectiveness of the impact test. The courts
have not rejected the test because its results fail to fit within
consistent categories.
The most important of the other tests used by courts53 has
been the "venue by necessity" or "practicality" test. In this analysis, venue is allowed under the "district. . . in which the claim
arose" language in any forum vaguely connected with the claim
when no other district could have proper venue because the claim
engages multiple parties in various districts, or because all substantial contacts occurred in a foreign country.5 4 This test, essentially a derivative of the weight-of-contacts test, focuses on the
need for a forum rather than the propriety of a particular forum.
The importance of this test increases as interstate and international commercial ventures increase in number and scope.
All of the less popular tests can fit analytically within the
weight-of-contacts schema, and several authorities have recognized this concentricity. The impact and weight-of-contacts tests
have frequently been used concurrently.55 Courts and commentators have argued that the place of the injury should be the most
heavily weighted contact." The practicality test has a different
52. See sources cited at note 28 supra.
53. Other tests include: analogy to doctrines of substantive law, analogy to choiceof-law doctrine, and limitation by long-arm statute only. Many courts, however, apply no
recognizable test at all. These approaches have all been widely criticized. See, e.g., 15 C.
WRIGHT, supra note 18, § 3806 at 28; Wood, supra note 10, at 410.
54. Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 529 (8th Cir. 1973); Arnold v. Smith
Motor Co., 389 F. Supp. 1020, 1022-23 (N.D. Iowa 1974); Honda Assocs., Inc. v. Nozawa
Trading, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 886, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
55. E.g., Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 526 (8th Cir. 1973); Johnson
v. Mississippi, 78 F.R.D. 37 (N.D. Miss. 1977).
56. Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123, 133 (D.N.H. 1975);
Brieant, supra note 27, at 843.
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focus, but its elements are essentially the same as those of the
weight-of-contacts test. Although the variety of tests may be reconciled into one schema, the unresolved problem of interpreting
the definite article "the" in the statute creates uncertainty within
that schema: are the contacts to be weighed in order to discover
the one district in which they are greatest, or merely to eliminate
those districts in which the contacts are miniscule and in which
venue would be unjustified?
IV.

ILLUSORY ANSWERS

The historical trends and competing policies, the indefiniteness of the 1966 amendments, and the wanderings of lower courts
searching for a methodology to apply the language of the amendments all demonstrated the need for clarification by the United
States Supreme Court. Without a clear definition of the practical
meaning of the statute, litigants faced the temporal, financial,
and emotional expenses of inconclusive appeals 7 Prior to these
amendments, unlucky plaintiffs had even been dismissed for
improper venue, 58 although transfer is the favored remedy. If the
tests chosen allowed venue that was too expansive, due process
questions would arise;59 but if the tests chosen were too restrictive, fairness and judicial efficiency would be compromised by
excessive transfers and litigation." A precise understanding of the
statutory language-a definition of the number of districts allowed and a choice of a workable test-used by Congress in the
1966 amendments was necessary.' Leroy v. Great Western offered the Supreme Court an opportunity to provide much needed
guidance.
A.

The Facts"

Great Western United Corporation, a Dallas-based business,
57. See Wood, supra note 10, at 399.
58. Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 251, 252 (N.D. Cal. 1973); see Foster,
supra note 22, at 28-31.
59. Foster, supra note 22, at 37.
60. Wood, supra note 10, at 403; see generally Foster, supra note 33, at 105. The
theory relied on by defendants was that the more restrictive the tests, the better the
chance of transfer, dismissal and dilatory tactics; hence, the rewards for litigating venue
become greater and litigation is encouraged.
61. 1 MOORE's, supra note 35, 0.142 [5.-2] at 1429; 15 C. WRIGHT, supra note 20, §
3806 at 36; Wood, supra note 10, at 400, 403.
62. The facts that follow are derived from the Supreme Court and the lower court
opinions. 99 S. Ct. 2710 passim; 577 F.2d 1256 passim; 439 F. Supp. 420 passim.
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attempted to purchase a significant number of shares in Sunshine
Mining and Metal Company, a corporation with most of its assets
and activities in Idaho, but with other major interests in New
York and Maryland. Great Western complied with all federal
disclosure requirements under the Williams Act,6 3 which governs
corporate tender offers. The Texas corporation also sought favorable preliminary rulings from the Idaho, New York, and Maryland
authorities charged with enforcing the respective state takeover
statutes.6 4 While Maryland and New York officials avoided decisions, 5 the Idaho authorities did review the documents submitted
by Great Western, and found that a hearing and additional disclosure was necessary. The Idaho officials then ordered Great
Western to suspend its tender offer activities under penalty of a
$5,000 fine and three-years imprisonment of its officers. To avoid
delay, and to simplify the complexity in meeting the requirements of various states, Great Western filed suit in the Northern
District of Texas, its home district, against officials of the three
states. As plaintiff in this action, Great Western requested declaratory and injunctive relief and claimed that the various takeover
statutes were unconstitutional and preempted by federal law.
Since no proceedings had actually taken place in New York or
Maryland, the claims against those officials were dismissed for
failure to raise justiciable issues." The Idaho officials challenged,
among other things, the propriety of venue in the Northern District of Texas.
B.

The Lower Court Opinions

The district court 7 refused venue under section 1391(b), apparently basing its decision upon a finding that the impact test
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)-(W, 78n(d)(1) (1976). Amendments to these sections made
subsequent to the date Great Western initiated its declaratory action are not noted because Great Western had made all disclosures required of it at the time of its tender offer.
Note, however, that some amendments have been made.
64. For elements of the statutes and comparison to the Williams Act, see 577 F.2d at
1263. See also IDAHO CODE § 30-1501 to -1513 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
65. Neither state felt the conditions were ripe for issuing a ruling since the tender
offer was merely pending. Because Sunshine Mining's basic operation was in Idaho, these
states chose to wait for the final Idaho ruling. 577 F.2d at 1264.
66. 99 S. Ct. at 2717.
67. 439 F. Supp. 420. The district court did, however, approve venue under the
special venue provisions of § 27 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §
78aa (1976). Approving venue under this provision, the district court found the takeover
statute invalid.
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would produce an unmanageable result. Since the restraint of the
takeover statute had impact on all the potential offeree shareholders of Sunshine Mining,68 the plaintiff could have proper
venue in any one of many districts with justification equal to that
of the Northern District of Texas. This unworkable outcome was
avoided by the court, which contended that the language of section 1391(b) recognized only one district in which the claim could
arise.6" The impact test was therefore overridden by the practicality test."
On the question arising from the 1966 amendments, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 7' concluded that the district
court erred in applying the impact test to the offeree shareholders. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the situs of the essential
effects was Dallas since the restraints injured the offeror corporation, and not the potential sellers, who were not even parties to
the suit. 2 Under a venue-by-necessity approach," that court
found the Texas district to be the only practical district, since
other states with similar regulations could have asserted power
over the tender offers and could not justifiably be made parties
to the action in Idaho or any other one state.
The conflict between the opinions of the district court and
circuit court demonstrates vividly that the facts of Leroy v. Great
Western provided the Supreme Court with ample opportunity to
develop answers to numerous questions surrounding the language
"the judicial district

. . .

in which the claim arose." Both lower

courts applied essentially the same tests, but arrived at opposite
conclusions. The Supreme Court, at least superficially, answered
some of the questions raised by these and other conflicting opinions.
C.

The Supreme Court Holdings

The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, 74 finding that
68. See notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra.
69. 439 F. Supp. at 433.
70. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
71. 577 F.2d 1256. This court also approved venue under special provisions of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
72, 577 F.2d at 1273 n.5.
73. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
74. 99 S. Ct. 2710 (1979). The decision was divided six to three. The majority refused
the selection of venue under both the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and § 27 of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976). The three dissenting
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venue was improper under the general provision of section
1391(b). Justice Stevens in the majority opinion expressly
claimed to avoid decision on whether the language of the 1966
amendments allowed venue in more than one district. 5 The Court
held that venue could be proper only in the District of Idaho" for
two reasons: under a weight-of-contacts analysis," the contacts
between the claim and the Northern District of Texas fell short
of those between the claim and Idaho;" and under a practicality
test,79 allowing venue in Texas would likewise subject the Idaho
officials to suit in the federal districts of at least the forty-eight
other states in which Sunshine Mining shareholders resided. The
impact test"° was seemingly rejected in the opinion." The Court's
decision, however, includes more than mere application of the
tests.
The majority opinion asserted that the general venue statute
did not authorize the plaintiff to rely on either the economic
policy of consolidating suits or the policy of convenience to the
aggrieved plaintiff. 2 These previously acceptable policies apparently were rejected by the Court.83 Instead, the majority based its
decision on the more traditional policy of protecting the defendant. 4
The Court's selection of the more traditional policy consideration indicates the degree of restrictiveness used in interpreting
the critical language of section 1391(b). Because the Court chose
a policy giving deference exclusively to the convenience of the
defendant, a plaintiff now may be allowed only very limited discretion in its choice of a forum. In dictum,5 the Court interpreted
Justices argued that venue was proper under the special provision of the Securities Act.
No dissent, therefore, was registered against the resolutions of the § 1391(b) issues. The
case has been remanded to the Fifth Circuit, Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 602
F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1979), which in turn remanded it to the Northern District of Texas,
where the case is now pending.
75. 99 S. Ct. at 2717.

76. Id. at 2718-19.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
99 S. Ct. at 2718.
See notes 68-69 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 49-52 and accompanying text supra.
99 S. Ct. at 2718.
Id. at 2717.

83. See id. at 2818. See notes 23-27 and accompanying text supra. These policies are
rejected, at least for federal question cases.

84. 99 S. Ct. at 2717. But see id. at 2717-18 (Court refers to convenience of litigants).
85. Id. at 2718. This interpretation is dictum since the Court prefaces the statement
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the 1966 amendments to mean, in essence: If and only if it is
unclear that the claim arose in one specific district, the plaintiff
then may choose between districts that are equally plausible in
terms of (1) availability of witnesses; (2) accessibility of evidence;
and (3) convenience to the defendant." These three factors have
been widely accepted," but the Court undermined its own position by erroneously citing Braden v. 30th JudicialCircuit Court"
to support its emphasis on convenience of the defendant alone.
In that case the convenience of both parties was crucial; the
Braden court concluded that the alternative districts were no less
89
convenient to either party.
In Leroy v.Great Western, the Court also concluded that the
1966 amendments did not need to be interpreted to support any
broad view of the allowable choices of venue, if a more narrow
construction did not re-open the venue gap that the amendments
were intended to close. 0 That Congress did not intend to give the
plaintiff an unfettered choice "is absolutely clear,"9 ' although
most authorities agree that the intent of Congress in the 1966
amendments is at best inconclusive. 2 The Supreme Court approached these questions of interpretation as it did the application of test and policy questions, with only the appearance of
reaching definitive resolution.
V.

EXAMINATION OF THE ILLUSIONS

In its choice and application of tests, in its evaluation of
policy, and in its suggested interpretation of the statute, the
Court confronted the problems that have been faced by the lower
with the words "in the unusual case" and subsequently concludes that "[tihis case is
not, however, unusual." Id.

86. The Court's language is as follows:
[In the unusual case in which it is not clear that the claim arose in only one
specific district, a plaintiff may choose between those two (or conceivably even
more) districts that with approximately equal plausibility-in terms of the
availability of witnesses, the accessibility of other relevant evidence, and the
convenience of the defendant (but not of the plaintiff)-may be assigned as the
locus of the claim.
Id.
87. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
88. 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
89. Id. at 494.
90. 99 S. Ct. at 2717.

91. Id. (citing Denver & R. G. W. R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 387 U.S.
556, 560 (1967)).
92. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text supra.
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courts, but only superficially calmed the confusion. Analysis reveals that the apparent answers dissolve into additional questions
and heighten the previous level of disorder.
A.

Selection of the Weight-of-Contacts Test

To apply the words "in which the claim arose," the Court3
apparently chose one of the weight-of-contacts test variations.
Although the Court did not expressly label its methodology, the
test can be identified by the analysis and language in the opinion.
The Court's analysis was based on three critical contacts. The
Court first analyzed the actions taken in Idaho. The particular
actions examined were those manifested in the enactment and
operation of the takeover statute. Secondly, the Court relied on
the location in Idaho of relevant evidence and witnesses. Finally,
the Court examined the nature of the review of Idaho's statute
and concluded that the review would be more properly handled
by a federal court in the enacting state. 4 These three contacts
were balanced against any contacts between the claim and the
Texas forum. 5 The Court recognized that contacts existed in
Texas but stated that they fell "far short of those connecting the
claim and the Idaho district."96 From the several districts having
contacts with the claim, the Court chose the one, Idaho, which
had the greatest weight of contacts. The last sentence of the
majority opinion states that "the District of Idaho is the only one
in which 'the claim arose.' "97 This language identifies the Court's
test as the first variation of the weight-of-contacts test, the mostsignificant-contacts approach. 8
The Supreme Court's revival of this variation of the weightof-contacts test was not only contrary to the recent trend of case
law,99 but also created two distinct problems which cannot be
93. See notes 42-47 and accompanying text supra.
94. 99 S. Ct. at 2718. The Court states:
Most importantly, it is action that was taken in Idaho by Idaho residents-the
enactment of the statute by the legislature, the review of Great Western's filing
. [The bulk of the relevant evidence and witnesses . . . is also located
...
in the state [of Idaho]. Less important, but nonetheless relevant, the nature
of this action challenging the constitutionality of a state statute makes venue
in the District of Idaho appropriate.

Id.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 44-47 and accompanying text supra.
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resolved: the maximization of the mechanical difficulty inherent
in any weight-of-contacts test, and the creation of a contradiction
between implications of this particular test and other language in
the opinion.
Authorities have been perplexed in their efforts to develop,
in an acceptable manner, precise weights for contacts' 0 that
seemingly do not possess relative inherent values,'0 ' are not derived from closely related fields of law, 0 2 and do not necessarily
fit within established balancing schemes'."' This perplexity is
accentuated by use of the most-significant-contacts variation,
because this test requires an exacting discrimination between the
different weights of the contacts in order to determine the one
proper district. The substantial-contacts and more-thanminiscule variations,' 4 tests that are only intended to narrow
potential venues to those with a rational relation. to the claim,
require merely a determination that contacts exist. These tests
minimize the balancing problem.
Implicit in the Court's selection of the most-significantcontacts variation is that the words of the 1966 amendments
allow venue in only one district. This implication contradicts the
Court's statement that it decided the propriety of venue
"[w]ithout deciding whether this language [of the amendments] adopts the . . . assumption that a claim may arise in

only one district."'0 5 The Court selected a test that by its nature
always will determine that a claim arises in one and only one
district, but expressly disavowed that it made a decision about
the number of districts in which a claim may arise. A pronouncement that a claim. can arise at only one situs would not only be
contrary to the weight of authority,"' but also would fail to admit
any realistic view of the nature of claims or the mobility of society. The Court recognized the nonsensical basis of any such
100. 15 C. WRIGHT, supra note 20, § 3806 at 36.
101. For example, what value should be assigned to the factors of convenience both

to defendant and the court, or of accessibility of witnesses and nature of impact? These
factors have no common elements to compare.

102. For example, the elements in an analogy to substantive law factors and in a
consideration of the nature of impact or convenience to a party are not in the same fields
of law, and thus are not readily compared. See notes 53, 55-56 and accompanying text
supra.
103. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
104. See notes 44 & 47 and accompanying text supra.
105. 99 S. Ct. at 2717.
106. See notes 35-41, 44 & 53 and accompanying text supra.
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pronouncement by its reference to the "occasionally fictive assumption that a claim may arise in only one district."'' 7 The
intrinsic contradiction between this recognition and the Court's
choice of a test that requires a divining of the one district with
the greatest weight of contacts leaves an unresolved dilemma.
The problems in the mechanics of the most-significant-contacts
test, and in the contradiction created by its use, received no treatment in the opinion. Other problems, however, were referred to,
but received inadequate consideration.
B.

The Role of the Impact Test

The essence of the impact test is that the claim should originate in the district in which the injury occurs or is felt. This test
has been employed to fulfill two roles. The courts both have invoked the impact test as an alternative to other tests and have
utilized the test as one contact to be weighed in applying the
weight-of-contacts test.0 8 The Court in Leroy v. Great Western
equivocally rejected the impact test as an alternative approach
and incorrectly applied it as a consideration in its weight-ofcontacts analysis.
Immediately after weighing the contacts with Idaho, the
Court asserted that it "therefore reject[s] the Court of Appeals'
reasoning that the 'claim arose' in Dallas because . . . that is
where Idaho's statute had its impact on Great Western."100 This
language is ambiguous; it could be cohstrued fairly as either a
repudiation of the impact test as an alternative approach or as
merely a repudiation of the circuit court's application of the test
to the facts of the case. On this discrepancy the opinion is cryptic,
but because the Court's method of analysis generally followed the
weight-of-contacts test exclusively, one presumes that the Court
intended the rejection of the impact test as an alternative approach. This presumption is reinforced by the location of the
Court's discussion of the contacts in Idaho in the paragraph immediately preceding the language rejecting the impact test.
The precise location of this language in the opinion also indicates that the Court indeed considered the impact test to be an
element of the weight-of-contacts test. In the sentence following
the rejection language, the Court referred to the impact on Great
107. 99 S. Ct. at 2717 (emphasis added).
108. See notes 55-56 and accompanying text supra.
109. 99 S. Ct. at 2718.
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Western as "'contacts' between the 'claim' and the Texas district"1 ' that fell short of the Idaho contacts. The Court thus
recognized that there was impact in Dallas, but rejected its importance.
The Court's reliance on the third of its enumerated contacts
between the claim and Idaho, the nature of a federal case that
reviews the validity of a state statute,"' additionally suggests that
the impact test was used by the Court as an element in the
weight-of-contacts schema. One undeniable reason for the
Court's concern over the review of a state statute was the impact
that an unfair or incorrect review, which struck down the statute,
might have on state objectives that the statute was designed to
fulfill."' This impact of the outcome of the litigation combined
with the usual influences of comity and federalism, neither of
which were expressly mentioned by the Court, appears to be the
only justification for inclusion of the nature of the review action
as an element in balancing the contacts. While the Court stressed
this value of the impact in Idaho, the correlative value of the
impact in Texas was virtually ignored, or at least greatly discounted. A consideration of the impact on Great Western was
excluded from the analysis of the significant contacts giving rise
to venue in Idaho." 3 The policy position assumed by the Court
tends to mechanically preclude any consideration of convenience
of the plaintiff"i from the operation of the weight-of-contacts test.
The Court did, however, acknowledge the existence of an impact
in Texas and that this impact was a contact.' The weight-ofcontacts test has, as a necessary object, the fairness of balancing
all contacts relevant to the selection of venue."' The perfunctory
dismissal of the value of the impact in Texas was, therefore,
disconsonant with the objectives of the weight-of-contacts
schema.
The Court inequitably administered the impact test within
the weight-of-contacts analysis by selecting for consideration only
those facts which tended to show impact in Idaho.- Facts that the
Court arbitrarily omitted from its analysis indicated a coinci110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
99 S.Ct. at 2718.
Id.
See notes 82-86 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 109-10 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 42-48 and accompanying text supra.
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dence of impact. The impact on Sunshine Mining Corporation in
Idaho would have evolved from the potential takeover by Great
Western. The potential sales of stock could have resulted in an
impact on the shareholders of Sunshine Mining in at least fortynine states. These two impacts were in addition to those on the
State of Idaho and on Great Western. Logically, the only impacts
which would have been included in a test determining venue for
the trial were those which affected actual litigants in the action,
the State of Idaho and Great Western.
The interests of Sunshine Mining and its shareholders could
have been only indirectly affected by the outcome of this suit. If
the takeover statute were upheld, these ifnterests would have been
considered in the administrative hearings required by the statute.
Any decision directly affecting Sunshine Mining or its shareholders would have been made at that administrative level, not at the
level at which Leroy v. Great Western was brought. The Court
obviously could, not determine the results of the Idaho hearings.
If the Court had held, however, that the Idaho statute was unconstitutional or preempted, Sunshine Mining and its shareholders
still would have received the protection of the federal statute. The
potential for success of the offer made pursuant to the federal
disclosure requirements could not be predicted accurately from
the facts before the Court. Concern with the impact of Leroy v.
Great Western on Sunshine Mining or its shareholders in deciding the venue dispute, therefore, could be only speculative and
thus improper. Eliminating from consideration the impact on
these nonparties, the resulting question arises: whether the impact that should have been considered was the present impact
of the allegedly wrongful action on Great Western' 1 -the application of an unconstitutional or preempted statute to the plaintiff; or whether the impact that should have been considered
was the future impact of the litigation on the State of Idaho, 8
-the voiding of a state statute.
Distinctions between the application of present and future
impacts dictated that the only practicable, fair impact for consideration by the Court was the present impact of the allegedly
wrongful action on the plaintiff. The then present impact of the
actions of the defendants on the plaintiff was one that could have
been accurately measured at the time venue was properly liti117. See generally Wood, supra note 10, at 408-09.
118. Id.
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gated, before a decision on the merits." 9 In contrast, the outcome
of the litigation would have had a future impact only if the defendants were found to have acted wrongfully in the promulgation
or enforcement of the statute. Thus, the future impact could have
been analyzed only in retrospect, after the trial was completed.
This distinction between the times for accurately measuring impacts demonstrates that the application of future impacts is impractical. The application of future impacts is also unfair because
there would be an absence of impact from the outcome of litigation on a defendant prevailing on the merits. Hence, only wrongdoers, defendants losing on the merits, could argue a future impact of the litigation to justify venue. To thus give deference to
the interests of wrongdoers while ignoring the interests of innocent parties, the plaintiff in the same case or prevailing defendants in other cases, is a use of the impact test obviously discon20
sonant with fairness.'

The distinction between present and future impacts becomes
insignificant, however, if the Court was merely pursuing a policy
of convenience to the defendant,'2 ' for then the impact on Great
Western was irrelevant. If the Court indeed followed a policy of
choosing a place "'which may be convenient to the litigants'i.e., both of them,"' 22 then the impact on the plaintiff becomes a
contact of great weight'" and the distinction between present and
future impacts takes on added significance. Pursuant to the conclusion derived from these distinctions, the value of the impact
on Idaho would have been excluded from, or at least discounted
in any weighing of contacts. The impact of the wrongful action
on Great Western alone would have been considered. Thierefore,
Great Western's chances of obtaining venue in the Northern Dis4
trict of Texas would have been greatly enhanced.
The Court's failure to define more precisely its actual bases
119. See generally Barrett, supra note 12, at 612. See also 99 S. Ct. at 2716.

120. This argument is particularly forceful in Leroy v. Great Western, because plaintiff prevailed on the merits at the district court level. The takeover statute was held
invalid. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
121. 99 S. Ct. at 2718.
122. Id. (emphasis added) (citing S. Rae. No. 1752, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted
in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 3693, 3695).

123. See notes 55-56 and accompanying text supra.
124. Great Western also took actions in Texas (initiation of the tender offer) and
would have to supply corporate records as evidence and officers as witnesses. In addition,

the nature of the impact on a Texas business arguably could be better assessed in a Texas
district court.
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of decision regarding the use or rejection of the impact test, as
well as its reasoning in support of that decision, increases the
previous uncertainty about the status of the tests. Litigants could
find ample support in the opinion for either correctly and incorrectly utilizing or rejecting the impact test. The lower courts,
therefore, have guidelines that are more confusing than before the
Leroy v. Great Western decision.
C. A Fact-TailoredApproach
The Court's emphasis on the nature of the review of a state
statute may suggest that deference should be given to any unique
contacts in a particular case. This deference given to certain peculiar contacts, for example the special relationship of state
objectives and state statutes, indicates that the weight-ofcontacts test should always be tailored to the facts and substantive law of the case. This expression of the weight-of-contacts
test might present problems in establishing clear precedent and
predictability for litigants choosing a place for trial in a range of
case types that includes antitrust, 125 civil rights,12 labor,127 conas well as securities cases like
tracts and products liability,'2
29
Leroy v. Great Western.1
A fact-tailored approach would indeed assist courts in overcoming many of the analytical problems that arise from attempts
to weigh seemingly unrelated contacts in a suitable manner."'
The Supreme Court's unclear choice of tests and apparent misuse
of the nature of the action as an impact in the weight-of-contacts
schema are not cured by this derivative explanation. Rather these
deficiencies in the opinion undermine the usefulness of any facttailored approach. Because the facts did not justify the deference
125. E.g., Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd in
part, rev'd and remanded, 546 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1976).
126. E.g., Johnson v. Mississippi, 78 F.R.D. 37 (N.D. Miss. 1977); remandedas moot
per curiam, 586 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1978); Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
127. E.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Denver & R. G. W. R.R., 290 F. Supp.
612 (D. Colo. 1968).
128. E.g., Far-Mar-Co. v. Schultz Cattle Co., 71 F.R.D. 225 (W.D. Okla. 1976). The
"district . . . in which the claim arose" language also was added to subsection (a) of §
1391, governing venue in diversity actions. Since any area of the law can be the subject of
a diversity action, the import of the controversies surrounding these words is virtually
unlimited in scope. See Wood, supra note 10, at 407-10.
129. E.g., Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); Alemeda Oil
Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 164 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
130. See notes 100-03 and accompanying text supra.
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granted by the Court to the peculiar contacts of Leroy v. Great
Western,'3 ' lower courts and future litigants cannot be certain
how the test should be tailored.
D. Confusion in Policy and Interpretation
The confusion is only increased by the Court's perfunctory
dismissal of the policy bases that support venue in the Texas
district.' Many convincing policies relied on prior to Leroy v.
Great Western were rejected by the Court. The most significant
of these disapproved policies is convenience to the court. Courts
employing this convenience policy have emphasized: the judicial
and statutory trends toward expanding venue so it will not constrict broader jurisdictional grants;'33 the economy of consolidating suits in one action when possible; 3 ' and the recognition that
restricted venue will force plaintiffs in federal question actions,
similar to Leroy v. Great Western, to retreat to state courts where
venue options are broader. 3 ' Not only was the policy of convenience to the court seemingly disapproved by the Supreme Court
in Leroy v. Great Western, but the discussion of the reasons for
this rejection raises doubts about its continued validity in deciding venue questions. The Court gave two reasons for rejecting the
policy of convenience that would "be served by consolidating the
three claims": ' (1) no justiciable claims remained against the
officials of New York and Maryland, and (2) the venue statute did
not authorize the plaintiff to rely on the convenience of consolidation. No question of consolidation was actually presented since
the sole remaining defendants were in Idaho. The Court could
have justifiably rejected this version of convenience by its absence alone. The second reason provided by the opinion is ambiguous. The Court did not demonstrate whether it objected to the
plaintiff's reliance on the policy or whether it objected to the
statute's authorization of the policy. If the Court intended that
plaintiffs could not invoke the convenience of consolidation to
justify venue, then in the future this consideration will be raised
in multi-defendant cases only sua sponte from the bench. Rarely
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See notes 117-19 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 82-86 and accompanying text supra.
See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
Barrett, supra note 12, at 635.
99 S. Ct. at 2717.
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would any of the several defendants choose to make this assertion
of policy, since it would tend to alleviate the impediments and
hardship to the plaintiffs prosecution of several trials. 3" If the
Court intended that this convenience consideration was not authorized by the statute, then the entire concept of the advantage
of unified suits is discredited or severely limited. The convenience
of consolidation, however, was not expressly repudiated, especially as that concept had been applied to convenience of the
courts. The uncertainty emanating from the diversity of policies
announced by authorities construing section 1391 and other
venue statutes, therefore, has been increased. Instead of relying
on the particular facts of this case and avoiding the uncertainty,
the Court went beyond that which was necessary and thereby
added to the confusion.
Additional policy confusion' exudes from conflicting statements in the opinion, reflecting indecision about which parties'
convenience was to be evaluated. The opinion cited protection of
the defendant as the purpose of venue'39 and listed "the convenience of the defendant (but not of the plaintiff)"'' 0 as one of the
vital elements in its interpretation of the venue statute. The
Court also favorably referred to language in a Senate report authorizing venue in a" 'place which may be more convenient to the
litigants'" and then indicated that the cited language meant
"both of them." '' The Court curiously cited with approval these
two inconsistent policies.
The confusion of policy objectives combined with the ineffectual choice and use of tests renders the Court's suggested
"broadest interpretation of the language of § 1391(b)"'' 1 inconsequential. In this proposed interpretation, the Court excluded the
policies of convenience to the courts or plaintiffs, a questionable
and unreliable approach.' The Court instead provided the plaintiff a choice only between districts with "equal plausibility" in
terms of (1) availability of witnesses, (2) accessibility of evidence,
137. Obviously, defendants generally would not wish to aid a plaintiff in bringing the
suit. Defendants would instead make tactical decisions with a goal of spreading out plaintiff's resources, thereby forcing the plaintiff to drop one or more of the suits.
138. See notes 121-22 and accompanying text supra.
139. 99 S. Ct. at 2717.
140. Id. at 2718 (emphasis in original).
141. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1752, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1966] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3693, 3695).
142. Id. at 2718.
143. See notes 21-29 and accompanying text supra.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1980

23

602

SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW
[Vol. 31
South
Carolina
Law Review,
Vol.REVIEW
31, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 11

and (3) convenience of the defendant."I Since the defendant's
place of residence is almost always more convenient, the choice
of venue will be as restricted in practice now as it was by the 1888
changes in the statute - to the residence of the defendant only.'
The plaintiff's choice only arises after a court first determines
that the claim does not clearly originate in a single district. The
uncertainty of tests, therefore, causes the interpretation to become inoperative, because without a certain analytical system
the prerequisite determination of whether the "claim arose in
only one specific district""'4 cannot be established. The
Court's broadest interpretation, therefore, besides being mere
dictum,' is unreliable and unworkable as precedent when viewed
from the perspective of the deficiencies in choice of policy and
methodology in the remainder of the opinion.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In terms of the general history and background policies, the
legislative intent, and the methodology of previous cases, the
trends toward expanded choice of venue were seemingly halted by
the Leroy v. Great Western decision. The superficial answers supplied by the Court were addressed to the questions that had been
raised by the lower courts and commentators since the 1966
amendments to section 1391(b). Upon scrutiny, however, those
answers decompose and meld into the most pervasive of recent
trends, the continually increasing confusion about the meaning
of the words "district.

.

.in which the claim arose." Rather than

resolving any of the uncertainties that have arisen from the
words, Leroy ,v. Great Western added to them principally by its
inconclusive selection of venue tests and its perfunctory discussion of policy considerations. The Court committed three crucial
errors in its analysis: (1) selection of the most perplexing variation of the weight-of-contacts test, the most-significant-contacts
variation; (2) an impractical and unfair use of the impact test;
and (3) a statement in dictum of an ill-conceived interpretation
of the crucial language. These errors were aggravated by the
Court's omission of an adequate pronouncement concerning the
number of districts in which a claim may arise for purposes of the
144.
145.
146.
147.

99 S. Ct. at 2718. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 10-18 and accompanying text supra.
99 S. Ct. at 2718.
See note 85 supra.
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statute and by the Court's mechanical repudiation of previously
acceptable policy positions.
Although the Court appeared to choose a test and define
policy, that appearance is not supported by substance. The prac-

titioner should be cautious about relying on the superficialities of
this opinion as a final judicial resolution of venue disputes arising
out of section 1391(b). In those courts relying on the illusory
answers of Leroy v. Great Western, litigants should expect that
results of future evocations of the "district . . . in which the
claim arose" language will justifiably and necessarily follow recent patterns of confusion. The Supreme Court should soon have
opportunity to refine its position."'
G. Marcus Knight
148. The American Law Institute has proposed a legislative correction as an alternative to the courts' currently futile attempts to make sense of the words of the 1966 amendments. The ALI proposal classifies some of the variables and gives plaintiffs a viable
choice of forums. Under this scheme, plaintiffs may bring suit:
(1) in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise
to the claim occurred, or where a substantial part of property that is the subject
of the action is situated, or (2) where any defendant resides, if all defendants
reside in the same state, or (3) where any defendant may be found, if there is
no district within the United States that would be a proper forum under (1) or
(2).
ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS,

Commentary-FederalQuestion, Section 1314, Subsection (a), at 217 (1969). A legislative
correction may indeed be the solution and the confusion after Leroy v. Great Western may
be the strongest lobbying tool to use in Congress.
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